GA pilots who routinely fly in the New York/New Jersey area say the FAA shoulders some of the blame for the rash of more than a dozen TFR violations in early June. Jeff Ross, who flies an Aztec out of Morristown, New Jersey, where Air Force One lands to deliver President Trump to his Bedminster golf club, said the TFR for his visit June 6 disappeared from the FAA’s online list and that likely played a role in at least some of the TFR busts. “Someone hit the wrong button and removed it from the FAA TFR website,” he said. That, in turn, dropped it from sites like Skyvector, which is an approved source for TFR information that satisfies the FAA’s requirement that pilots seek the latest information on TFRs. The other approved method is to get an FSS briefing.
The sudden spike in violations prompted NORAD to issue a plea to GA operators to ensure they check NOTAMs and the TFRs before heading out. Last week was particularly busy for TFRs with Trump also attending an NBA basketball game in New York. We sought comment from both NORAD and the FAA on the apparent mix-up with the TFR notifications but did not get a response in time for our deadline. Pilots who contacted us also had suggestions on the form and content of TFRs. One said whoever writes them is burying the key information pilots need (when and where and for how long) under several paragraphs describing the security risks that justify the imposition of the TFR. There are also tiny TFRs below 400 feet on the graphics that are exclusion zones for drones and should have their own website, another respondent told us. All who contacted us doubted the overall effectiveness of TFRs, which were created after the 9-11 terrorist attacks on New York City.
What a mess! No wonder so many pilots got caught up in these TFR’s. Hopefully they won’t get violated for what looks like the FAA’s incompetence.
Given access to mobile devices, it’s surprising how many pilots never bother to check NOTAM’s or destination weather. (Insert palm sap emoji here)
“One said whoever writes them is burying the key information pilots need (when and where and for how long) under several paragraphs describing the security risks that justify the imposition of the TFR.”
This has been one of the biggest issues with these TFRs. The ALL-CAPS TEXT also needs to be fixed because it makes the whole text more difficult to read.
Let’s play “Find the Important Information”. PS — there were SEVEN PAGES of this stuff in this morning’s Leidos brief for a routine IFR flight of 60nm range, none of which applied to the flight.
FDC 6/6840 ZFW TX..AIRSPACE MANSFIELD, TX..TEMPORARY FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS. PURSUANT TO 49 USC 40103(B)(3), THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) CLASSIFIES THE AIRSPACE DEFINED IN THIS NOTAM AS ‘NTL DEFENSE AIRSPACE’. ANY PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY OR WILLFULLY VIOLATES THE RULES CONCERNING OPS IN THIS AIRSPACE MAY BE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CRIMINAL PENALTIES UNDER 49 USC SECTION 46307. PILOTS WHO DO NOT ADHERE TO THE FOLLOWING PROC MAY BE INTERCEPTED, DETAINED AND INTERVIEWED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT/SECURITY PERSONNEL. PURSUANT TO 14 CFR 99.7, SPECIAL SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (SSI), ALL UNMANNED ACFT SYSTEM (UAS) FLT OPS ARE PROHIBITED: WI AN AREA DEFINED AS 1NM RADIUS OF 323303N0970452W (TTT180019.2) SFC-400FT AGL EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UNTIL 2607210459 UTC (2359 LOCAL 07/20/26). EXC AS SPECIFIED BLW: A. UAS OPS IN DCT SUPPORT OF AN ACT NTL DEFENSE, HOMELAND SECURITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, FIREFIGHTING OR SAR MISSIONS ARE EXEMPT FROM THIS TFR. B. UAS OPS MAY BE PERMITTED WI DEFINED SSI AIRSPACE WITH DHS AUTHORIZATION AND OPERATED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE OFFICIAL IN CHARGE. FOR DHS AUTHORIZATION EMAIL DRONES@DHS.GOV C. UAS OPR WHO DO NOT COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS ARE WARNED THAT PURSUANT TO 10 U.S.C.SECTION 130I AND 6 U.S.C.SECTION 124N, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE(DOD), THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY(DHS) OR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE(DOJ) MAY TAKE SECURITY ACTION THAT RESULTS IN THE INTERFERENCE, DISRUPTION, SEIZURE, DAMAGING, OR DESTRUCTION OF UNMANNED ACFT DEEMED TO POSE A CREDIBLE SAFETY OR SECURITY THREAT TO PROTECTED PERSONNEL, FAC, OR ASSETS. D. THE FAA RECOMMENDS THAT ALL ACFT OPR CK NOTAMS
FREQUENTLY FOR POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THIS TFR PRIOR TO OPS. OPR MAY REVIEW THE TFR DETAILS AT https://TFR.FAA.GOV/ OR https://WWW.1800WXBRIEF.COM. 202606091800-202607210459
🤦♂️😵💫
Happened to me. I checked the Notams and they were so confusing that I called Leidos Flight Service. They went over my flight plan and assured me that I and my flight plan were in the outer ring. The next day I check Skyvector and sure enough I’m good. I get my clearance and my flight plan is rejected. Apparently the TFR (inner ring) I was concered about was still active. I had to refile a new flight plan with my engine running. Expensive in a turbine.
TFRs are extremely difficult to read especially with dozens, if not hundreds of them to go through, most of which are irrelevant. Many also specify location by GPS coordinates instead of more human recognizable points such as airports or intersections. I sure hope this isn’t the “new improved” system they’ve been talking about because it is still a horrible relic of the 60’s.
“Most TFR violations are preventable and can be avoided through thorough preflight planning,” Royal Canadian Air Force Maj. Gen. David Moar, director of NORAD operations, said.
So according to the director of NORAD, some TFR violations are unavoidable even with thorough preflight planning. That speaks volumes.
I fly in the Washington DC FRZ. It seems like the only reason for its existence is as a bandaid for the media. Should Washington be protected, most assuredly! But, all these TFRs don’t seem to provide any real protection.
And I don’t fly VFR anywhere close to any FRZ or TFR. IFR only.
Same here – but that shouldn’t be a requirement for staying out of FAA jail.
I agree. But, I refuse to take chances. However, it does seem like the FAA is easing up a bit on “punishment.” On the other hand, new pilots should be getting as much additional training as possible regarding all restricted airspace. Experienced pilots should always be aware. My aircraft has far more avionics than the first military aircraft I flew, moving map displays, GPS and the various iPad navigation systems. Long gone, in the DC area, to just go sightseeing.
You are very wise in that regard. VFR is great for open country, photo shoots and sightseeing, but anywhere there is high traffic volume, it’s just asking for trouble. The problem we are seeing now is that there are so many VFR targets on the radar that VFR traffic is getting priority over IFR traffic on a filed flight plan. So the VFR traffic which is often not even talking to ATC gets to do exactly what they want, while IFR traffic gets vectored away from their flight plan in order to avoid VFR targets that don’t even know IFR traffic is there, or just don’t care.
If you create a great tool, and you pair it with a horrible user interface, you do not have a great tool.
And in the future, navigation around these TFR’s could become far more complicated according to this article.
https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/world-news/war/russias-new-warning-shot-from-space/
This is not news. Phil Harbin and his attempt to commandeer GPS guard bands for terrestrial internet use proved that a decade and a half ago. In an attempt to convince the FCC that the laws of RF physics did not apply to his Lightsquared Company he set up a test facility in the NV desert. At a small fraction of his license application in the 1500 MHz spectrum adjacent to the GPS extremely low power signals, he was able to block and disrupt GPS signals in a 1500 nm radius in one fell swoop, stretching from DEN to offshore beyond LAX. It was briefly incarnated for another attempt with the recent past administration’s FCC and again failed miserably. GPS is remarkably easy to jam which is why we should have kept LORAN-C, which is remarkably hard to jam, as a backup.
I agree! eLORAN could be built into the design of GPS receivers for little extra circuitry and programming and the network of stations is very low cost. And it is land based, thus far more reliable. I argued for that back when the proposal to shut down LORAN came but voices like mine were ignored.
I concur. Loran C worked well. We could use it for area navigation and non-precision approaches over huge swaths of the country. It was decomissioned allegedly because of the expense of maintaining the “few”broadcasting ground stations it required, but I would be interested to see a cost comparison between Loran C casts and those of maintaining a VOR MON system requiring many more broadcast stations and more limited geographic coverage.
The cost of LORAN-C transmitters is cheap. They operated in the MF radio band, and those transmitters are easy to build from inexpensive components. Push a kW or two through them and you have 800-1500 miles range. The radio receivers are likewise not sophisticated and with modern signal processing techniques, probably pretty accurate. The biggest cost is having monitoring stations to validate signal integrity. Again cheap, and amenable to computer wave form analysis and correction. The biggest shortcoming is the atmospheric bending along large ranges of coastal waters at sunrise/sunset. But the added bonus is a terestrial network of Loran covered the coasts at least as far out as the Flemish Cap of the Grand Banks in the Atlantic, back in the LORAN-A days. Loran C serves the coastal and offshore marine activities too. But, I guess that’s ancient radionavigation history.
Many are still not aware of.
My opinion, just about all TFRs are a total waste of time and impossible to determine. CB’s presentation is a wonderful example. Presidential, yes. But most others do nothing to protect whatever it is, if it can actually be determined, location or event. The three and five miles ones, any bad guy willing to crash an airplane, can do so in a matter of two to three in any small aircraft. And they are not protected by F-16s anyhow. Until someone untangles them all and provides plain language descriptions of them, just a joke.
For years and years and years, some of us pointed out that the NOTAM system was really just barely usable at all. All we got back from bureaucrats and even some instructors were denials.
But after enough evidence of the truth piled up, they finally had to admit that we were right and that the system needs more than a little adjustment, but really a major overhaul.
This is really just a particular case of that same problem continuing to remain unsolved.
I imagine that area is a mess for flight planning, given how cluttered the NOTAM system is, pair that with human error in actually displaying the TFR correctly and it’s a no-brainer that violations will occur. This is just basic human factors knowledge. The TFR text itself is poorly done, as well. Here’s a TFR text for the KMMU area I just pulled:
Not that they bury the most important part of this all caps TFR text (bolded) a third of the way through it. Also, the first time I accessed the TFR.FAA.GOV map for replying to this article I got an error that the layer could not be loaded and I had to close the tab and re-open the site to get it to work. When a system is this cumbersome it increases the chances of errors.
Having run an airport deep in the DC FRZ for 20+ years post-9/11, I can attest to the user-unfriendlyness of the system – both then and now. It got to the point that I had to generate a boiled-down, “here’s what you need to know” version to deal with some of it.
Case in point…every NOTAM having to do with the FRZ spent a bunch of time and words describing the meets and bounds of the FRZ, citing the appropriate CFR sections (which were not always correct) and a bunch of other stuff. One had to read through way down in that mess to figure out who could get in and under what circumstances. They were not easy to understand even under a careful reading, demonstrated by the volume of phone calls and emails I got. More than once, a would-be transient visitor misunderstood things (or decided that I didn’t know what I was talking about – which was always fun) and learned otherwise the hard way.
And some of it just didn’t make sense. I could write a book on the Big Rabbit Hole that’s the whole FRZ/SFRA mess…but one of the things that always made me shake my head was how insulated the background check process for the FRZ was from the rest of the aviation security world. That process completely ignored whatever else they knew about a given pilot. As an example…in order to get a PIN, two pilots who were crew on the 89th (the Air Force One & Air Force Two crowd) had to go through the same screening process as some 10 hour pre-solo student pilot who the authorities had never heard of. Ditto a double-digit number of airline folks who were routinely flying in and out of DCA, which had (and still has) its own process.
It wouldn’t take a lot to make things work better, but it doesn’t seem like any random combination of simplicity and/or common sense has ever been on their radar.
End of rant…..