The NTSB says the RNAV approach being used by the pilot of an Epic E1000 turboprop after midnight at Steamboat Springs Airport last month was not available at night and both the runway end indicator lights (REILs) and PAPIs were NOTAM’d as not available when the plane crashed 75 feet below the top of Emerald Mountain, killing all four men onboard. The board issued its preliminary report last week and said the pilot was given vectors to the TILLI waypoint, which is the initial fix for two RNAV approaches, the RNAV Z and RNAV-E to Runway 32.
Its flight path deduced from ADS-B data was “consistent with the RNAV Z RWY 32 approach,” the one that’s not supposed to be used at night. The RNAV-E approach, which is available at night, goes around Emerald Mountain rather than directly over it. “The minimum descent altitude for the approach is 9,100 ft msl. The last recorded altitude for the airplane was 8,221 ft msl, and the airplane’s autopilot was engaged.”
A few days after the accident, the FAA issued a NOTAM listing the Z approach as not available. It did not explain the action. The NTSB also noted weather reported at the airport showed a scattered layer of cloud at 500 feet AGL, broken at 1,600 feet AGL and an overcast layer at 2,400. Aaron Stokes, a businessman from Franklin, Tennessee, his son Jakson Stokes, 21, and nephew Colin Stokes, 21, and Austin Huskey, 37, all from the same area, were identified as the victims.
I don’t believe its accurate to say this approach is NA at night: I think a close reading of the notes on the plate for the RNAV Z RWY 32 shows that circling is allowed to RWY 14 at night if the circle is conducted to the SW of the runway (right traffic).
I don’t think this small difference has anything to do with the outcome though, conducting a circling approach at night into KSBS can only be considered poor judgement IMO. Adding the weather and NOTAMS makes the decision even more fraught.
It was a tragic accident that has highlighted for me how important it is to be fully aware of close-in terrain and the associated notes on the plate.
Perhaps the more important lesson is never to lose sight of the larger picture in ADM, before getting focused on the nuances of a particular approach.
Based on the weather, it is possible that the airport was spotted at or before the MDA and a decision to continue the descent was made. Then, they failed to notice the airport environment disappear in lower clouds or by terrain obstruction which should have caused an immediate go-around. Get-there-ites seamed to be the cause of the increasingly poor decision making.