Max Trescott and Rob Mark analyze two crashes, one which is in the headlines, and the other which was very personal to Rob as it involved a pilot friend of his. They open with the crash at LaGuardia, where an Air Canada regional jet collided with a fire truck while landing. They examine how a separate emergency, possible controller overload, and combined frequencies may have lined up in a classic Swiss-cheese chain of events. Rob, who is a former air traffic controller, talks about a rule change that occurred years ago for crossing vehicles and aircraft across active runways. It is a sobering look at runway-incursion risk, situational overload, and why vehicles and airplanes can never safely share the same space without strong procedural barriers.
Then the episode turns deeply personal. Rob talks about the fatal March 4 crash of Cessna T210M N19FB near Chicago Executive Airport, flown by a pilot he knew personally through the local aviation community and Civil Air Patrol. Using the preliminary report and additional ADS-B analysis, Max and Rob walk through the RNAV Runway 16 approach, the low-altitude alerts, the nonstandard descent profile, and the dangers of choosing to fly an instrument approach that is at or below minimums.
What makes this episode stand out is its human side. Max and Rob talk candidly about what it feels like when a crash stops being abstract and becomes the loss of someone you knew, and how pilots can process that loss while turning it into safer decisions in their own flying.
As a Navy Carrier Air Wing flight surgeon in the ’80s I was on nine Class A Mishap Investigation Boards that involved loss of life or aircraft. Everyone in the process knew our lost shipmates well. Trigger warning for the squeamish: my hands were in the chest of an aviator who suffered a flight deck ejection, and could not be revived.
When I was an aerobatic competitor and air show demo pilot a decade later ten of my friends died in crashes.
I am in no way trying to win some gruesome tally contest.
I do deeply appreciate the gift those lost colleagues can give us who still fly by providing scenarios we study carefully to learn what may go terribly wrong; with that knowledge from another’s fatal experience hopefully we avoid it ourselves.
Warren, thanks for your input and service. I have a question for you. In your experience, was there statistically anything you noticed about the age and experience level of these fallen pilots?
Hi Jay, Thanks for your question. My personal experience obviously had a huge impact on me, but anecdotes provide limited utility in understanding the big picture (i.e. “statistics”). Naval Safety Center assimilated, brilliantly analyzed and disseminated conclusions, common factors and trends from the standardized detailed input and opinions of individual mishap boards and their endorsers. Short answer–no, the varieties of Swiss cheese and their holes lining up I saw were often weird, unexpected and unique for each.
Brief rant here: the conclusive Navy MIR was due in less than a month and frequently completed in less than two weeks, barring delay from some extraordinary engineering investigation, deep sea recovery or the like. It was published by Navy message, required reading for every aviator and usually discussed at squadron AOMs. WHY does NTSB require 18 to 24 months to finish a civil investigation? Variable YouTube videos and podcasts are filling some GA need not satisfied by a responsible expert public agency.