The chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board says all traffic using airside surfaces at major airports should have transponders that trigger the warning system that alerts controllers to potential conflicts on the ground. In a news conference held to give updates on the collision between an Air Canada Express regional jet and an airport fire truck Sunday night, Jennifer Homendy said controllers need the full picture of what’s where at the airport. “Air traffic controllers should know what’s before them, whether it’s on airport surface or in the airspace. They should have that information to ensure safety,” she said. It’s something the NTSB itself hasn’t recommended, but it would appear that recommendation is coming. The CRJ 900 hit the truck as it was rolling out after landing on a flight from Montreal. The truck had been cleared to cross the runway and did not heed calls from the controller to stop. A timeline of significant events in the minutes leading up to the collision has been released and is copied below.
Meanwhile, Air Canada has identified the two pilots killed in the collision as Antoine Forest, 30, and a resident of Quebec, and MacKenzie Gunther, age not released, and a recent graduate of the pilot program at Seneca Polytechnic in Toronto. Forest flew bush planes before joining Jazz Aviation, which operated the CRJ, in 2022. Gunther went straight to the airline after graduating from Seneca in 2023. “These were two young men at the start of their career, so it’s an absolute tragedy that we’re sitting here with their loss,” Federal Aviation Administration Administrator Bran Bedford said. More than 40 others were hurt in the crash, but most have been released from local hospitals. Flight Attendant Solange Tremblay was thrown from the airplane and was found on the runway some time after the crash, still strapped in her seat. She suffered multiple fractures and is recovering in the hospital. “It’s a complete miracle,” her daughter Sarah Lepine told a Quebec television station. “She had a guardian angel watching over her. It could have been much worse.”
NTSB officials cut a hole in the roof of the plane to recover the flight data and cockpit voice recorders but have not reviewed the recordings in detail. They have also not interviewed the two controllers who were in the cab at the beginning of their night shift on Sunday. They will also be talking to the two firefighters in the truck. Some of the investigators were delayed getting to New York by security lineups and by a ground stop at Newark Airport on Monday that further compounded flight access to the Big Apple.
Is Jennifer Homendy kidding here? I listened to her news conference, as well, and heard the same thing. I fail to see how ADS-B equipped ground vehicles would have made what happened here any better. I question why she’s even saying that SO early in the investigation. Is she using ‘transference’ to place blame on a missing inanimate object or ‘the system’ to deflect from the root cause here? I’ll concede that her travel to New York put her in the position of time duress, but I fail to see how she’s coming to that conclusion and why she’s even saying it SO early?
The first question I’d want to know here is … “Does the tower have an ADS-B readout screen available? I’m going to assume that they do. If not, her point is moot. The cleared ADS-B equipped CRJ is approaching the runway and should have been visible to the controller as it moved closer either on a screen or by looking out the window. Taxiway D is a known position relative to the touchdown zone and is visible to the tower. The controller cleared the airplane to land #2, 1 minute and 57 seconds prior to issuing the ‘cleared to cross’ to the fire truck at 20 seconds before. Even if the trucks were transponding, he already knew exactly where they were. If the tower doesn’t have a scope, he cleared an airplane to land prior and didn’t issue a ‘go around’ command to it before allowing the trucks to cross. There were two “he’s” in the tower … were they not talking to each other?
At 2+17 before, the CRJ was cleared to land #2. At +20 seconds before, 1+57 later, the controller cleared the fire trucks to cross. Did he not see where the CRJ was on his screen? Did he not remember he cleared it to land because of the exigency of the fire trucks AND of the #1 Frontier airplane’s position? I notice that the position of the Frontier jet is not mentioned but … both airplanes have ADS-B and would have been visible to the local controller whether the ground vehicles were transponder equipped with respect to the landing airplane’s position, or not. Even if the CRJ had ADS-B ‘in’, they’d have had less than 20 seconds to notice the trucks moving during a time when they’re trying to safely land a jet. Those trucks were NOT moving when he cleared them to cross and Taxiway D is a known position.
IF a scope isn’t in place, the controller cleared two airplanes to land and now he’s dealing with fire trucks crossing, too. He shoulda verified where the cleared airplanes were either via a scope or with his eyes and dealt with them.
NOW, there’s another factor that just surfaced on TV. A pilot familiar with La Guardia says that airport is closed for noise abatement at midnight … so the two controllers were additionally under some duress to land all the in line traffic in time. Not clear is whether one was working ground control and the other was working local control … I’m assuming that was the case. It sure sounds like they weren’t talking to each other?
It’s perfectly clear to me what happened here. The accident chain was caused by task saturation and possible communication issues between two controllers in the tower cab made worse by emergency vehicles trying to cross an active runway, all at night with less than perfect weather conditions combined with tower closure timing are the root cause. Jennifer recommending ADS-B for all SO early in the investigation is ridiculous and would not have helped.
Here’s the bottom line. We’re paying controllers to keep airplanes and things apart and safe. In this case, the controllers didn’t do that. As a result, two innocent young men are dead. No amount of “prayers” or “RIP’s” are gonna bring them back and make it better for their families. Could the fire truck lead have verified that the runway WAS clear before moving … sure … but he was issued cleared to cross instructions and was himself under duress and so had expectation bias that all was well when … it wasn’t.
It has always bothered me that towers issue ‘clear to land #2’ instructions when — in fact — it isn’t clear. In much the same way as the command “position and hold” was changed to “line up and wait,” I think that no clearance to land should be issued until there’s nothing in front of the landing airplane which should ALWAYS be treated as priority #1 once it is given the landing clearance. THAT is their job. If they don’t do that, then they should issue “cleared to land #10” instructions and let the pilots figure it out. Ridiculous isn’t it; see the point? Further out, I think “continue” instructions should be issued which would — if forgotten — cause the landing crew to ask for verification of landing clearance and everybody would then make sure it was clear. Those poor pilots only had seconds to respond when it was too late; their fate was sealed 2+17 prior 😢
You pretty much hit the nail on the head Larry. It’s an unavoidable truism. Mistakes are most likely to occur when you are rushed, or, in a rush. It happens all the time and there is no technology out there to fix it. Rush rush rush… smash bang crash…
In addition, all you have to do is look at the airport diagram to know there is a problem. This isn’t rocket science although some people like to play make believe. You can’t keep trying to pack more and more airplanes, trucks, etc. into the same space without expecting incursions to rise.
Very well written Larry S. I don’t understand why “cleared to land (followed by any number)” is an allowed instruction. I was taught I had to ask special permission to land in coordination with another on the runway. I seem to remember that once given the “cleared to land” instruction, the runway was all mine – unless waived off or told to go around.
You are 110% correct, ZeroGee. Some years ago, I was a pilot/passenger in a LSA that was cleared to land and was rolling out. The tower cleared another airplane — the only other one — to land at what I felt was too little spacing and I recognized we were being overtaken. The pilot was an older gent who wasn’t exactly on top of his game so I took command of the situation as we were rolling out and had just barely passed a turnoff. I told the pilot to make a 135 degree turn and get the hell off the runway .. not knowing what sort of traffic was eating us up behind. The tower chewed the pilot out for not rolling down the runway which would have kept us ON that runway centerline a lot longer. I got the phone number of the tower and later called him. I told him I wasn’t PIC but was assuming all blame for what happened and told him that if he ever did that again and I found out about it, I’d have his buttski. And this was just a GA airport with only 2 airplanes in the pattern.
I, too, have been flying a VERY long time and was taught “Clear to land” means just that. Cleared #2 implies that the #2 pilot has to deal with another airplane over which he has absolutely no command. To me — and as Tommy above opined — they’re using that command as a means to stuff more airplanes into less and less space and within too little time.
Those double yellow lines have TWO directions. Until the landing airplane passes it, the runway IS his. Trying to stuff more airplanes onto that runway is an invitation to disaster. In this case, the runway belonged to Frontier until he passed those lines.
What happened here makes me VERY VERY irate. Saying ‘stuff happens’ isn’t good enough. In this case, think of how little had to be different to allow two young men to be back home and safe vs. meeting their maker.
Instead of saying that ground vehicles need ADS-B, Jennifer ought to be recommending abolishment of the use, “Cleared #2” or worse!
“Even if the trucks were transponding, he already knew exactly where they were.”. Precisely.
This AM, I heard that the tower DID have a brightscope but it wasn’t working. IF this is true … the local controller shoulda been using his ‘Mark I’ eyeballs. And ADS-B in the trucks would not have mattered.
I think the controller screwed up at 17 seconds. The truck driver screwed up at both 17 and 9 seconds.
There was a chance to be looking up to the approach path and seeing the CRJ. Those lights would have been seen as much as a half mile out or further.
Those ARFFs are very loud when underway. It’s entirely possible that the driver never heard the repeated tower calls to “STOP!”, Moreover, he would have been crossing R4 at Delta at an oblique angle, putting the landing aircraft at his 4-5 o’clock, requiring his right-seater to look back over his shoulder, discern the landing lights of the CRJ from the other ground clutter and recognize that there was landing traffic.
It appears to me that the biggest failure was the driver not hearing the repeated calls to stop. Situations like this occur daily but accidents are avoided because someone catches it and corrects it in time. You can throw all kinds of technology at the problem, but this appears to be a simple failure to hear the tower when the ARFF was underway.
Interesting point about the airport closing at midnight. So there were two competing pressures on the controllers. One to get the planes on the ground, and a second to get the emergency vehicles to the location of the emergency. They tried to satisfy both with tragic consequences.
If you listen carefully to the available audio streams on LiveATC.net – around the time the controller is calling “Stop” – it sure sounds like there is an alarm going off in the background.
Perhaps ASDE-X had done its job just from the radar component?
There are many levels of mitigation to any accident. The transponder is certainly one. Your outrage against the NTSB is misplaced. It sounded like chaos in the tower from the double aborted TO of the United plane, another swiss cheese hole (among many) that affects this. Having led and participated in many accident and near miss investigations, the reports by the NTSB are among the most professional and transparent reports of a horrible situation. SO WHY are the controllers task saturated? Does this airport meet task frequency/recommended limits, This is the second recent fire vehicle meeting an aircraft, why? It is not perfectly clear.
Years ago, we used to look down the runway to confirm that it was safe to cross. Now were supposed to believe in electronic doodads. Where did common sense go.
If controllers can’t be responsible for keeping vehicles apart — that they can SEE — and held accountable when they hose it up … maybe it’s time for AI to assume command in the tower cabs?
Wouldn’t common sense dictate this should have been happening the moment the technology was available? Was airport management trying to be cheap? How about the rest of the major airports around the nation? The rule should require every Class Charlie and Bravo as well as any Class Delta beyond a given number of 135/121 operations to have the equipment installed.
And, why are ground vehicles requesting to cross any runway not talking with tower instead of ground?
I think the airport management should be named in any legal claims made by the pilots’ families. It should include demands on any documentation on prior discussions of the equipment on airport vehicles.
Think of how things work when you’re flying, Ken. You’re talking to a ground controller to get you to the double yellow hold line at the runway. Once there, YOU switch to tower when you’re #1. You don’t use the ground controller to get across the runway; you’d use the tower. In the recording, it sounds to me as if one person was handling both functions anyways.
One thing that hasn’t been made clear (to me at least) is what frequency was Truck 1 using to talk to the controller?
If Truck 1 was on the tower frequency, did the Jazz pilots hear the controller clear Truck 1 to cross the runway 4?
One of the amazing aspects of the this crash to me is that the aircraft came to reset on the parallel taxiway Bravo, still perfectly aligned with Rwy 4/22. No damage to the rest of the plane; no post crash fire. I wonder if that was just providence or the efforts of the flight crew in the last seconds to avoid the truck
More than normal, I’ve been avoiding personal conclusions. But it’s difficult to get away from how programmed society and the system is as a whole for accidents like this to happen.
The airport and real estate at LGA was designed for DC3s. Millions of lights compete for attention at night in the NYC environment. We as a society are no longer asleep in bed at midnight. Instead we run around like chickens with our heads cut off being “productive”. I can’t remember how many times I’ve been cleared to land when I thought “how can they possibly clear us to land this far out with this much going on?” Worse yet, it is “normal” for one guy to handle both ground control and tower simultaneously, at night, at LGA when activity is supposedly at a low, but it’s never low. And then there are those non emergency emergencies like unidentified odors on the taxiing United flight which are treated as if a wing is about to fall off in flight, so fire brigades scramble across active runways to get there. When was it that we as a society lost our mind in favor of covering our overweight ass?
And at the end of the line, the lone linchpin in this rediculous chain is a poor hapless controller all alone, juggling too many balls at night in too short a time frame, who, after the accident, God bless his soul, says “I screwed up”. Too bad none of the rest of us are that spontaneously honest. I’m hard pressed to know how any human beings can be expected not to screw up in that scenario.
The closest I can come to a personal conclusion from what we know so far is that this poor controller is also one of the victims. He is also a hero for his attempt to rectify the situation followed by his spontaneous honesty.
And since we don’t learn a damned thing from accidents like this to change the system, this controller along with this crew and the injured passengers will not be the last of those hapless victims. But we in our slovenly bliss as a society will always have the audacity and temerity to ask God for a blessing which we do not deserve.
Yeah, it’s amazing to watch… Someone farts in coach and the fire engines come screaming so loud you couldn’t hear any other audio warning even if it was going off, lights flashing so bright you couldn’t see down the runway even if you wanted too.
Solution; cut flights in half by law and increase the number of controllers by double. Build another airport somewhere else and quit destroying perfectly good ones. We’re pretty good at finding money and technology to build ridiculous wind generators off shore. I’ll bet we could build one hell of an airport off shore. There’s lots of unlimited real estate out there and no people to complain about it.
I take issue with all of the railing against requiring ADS-B or other technologies as a preventative measure in today’s obviously overly busy modern airport environments. This isn’t the 1950s, the pace of operations is much higher now, and human error is a constant that will never be eliminated. Giving a task saturated controller a transponder based warning system or a better overview of what is going on is objectively a good idea. Making an airport vehicle operator crossing runways consult an overview of approaching and departing aircraft in addition to looking around is objectively a good thing. The old school just see and avoid, look both ways, etc, is plainly not tenable when so many lives are at stake.
Our airspace is far too crowded, our airports far too busy, our nights far too light polluted. At night, in the rain, there are far too many lights to visually acquire approaching aircraft or ground vehicles reliably enough for life safety. A single controller in the tower of a class B airport running tower and ground communications at night can easily become too task saturated to be relied on reliably enough for life safety. Bitter old men shaking their fists at the current generation for not paying enough attention or “relying on doodads” are placing ideology and ego over safety in a fast paced world that has left them behind. Changes must be made to procedures and equipment, or more of these accidents will happen.