New audio has emerged of last week’s Autoland activation over Colorado that includes transmissions on the Guard frequency from what appears to be one of the pilots. The audio was captured by Max Trescott, who, along with Rob Mark, produce a podcast called NTSB NewsTalk, which normally summarizes reports and highlights recent high-profile accidents. Trescott happened to be flying in Colorado on Dec. 20 (in an Autoland-equipped Cirrus SF50 Vision Jet) when the incident occurred and managed to record some of the pilot’s transmissions on a portable recorder. They match up with social media accounts from others who said they had heard the transmissions and clarify that with the Autoland engaged the crew was unable to change from the Guard frequency to communicate on the ATC frequencies. The podcast is below and the recorded radio transmissions start at 10:50.
The FAA is investigating the incident, and so far there have been no public statements from the pilots. On the day of the event, social media posts from other crews who had heard the transmissions indicated the pressurization issue initiated the activation and also discussed the inability to get off the Guard frequency. Public statements by the FAA and the aircraft operator Buffalo River Aviation have not included references to these radio calls.
Aha. The questions I wondered about in the first reporting of this incident are now answered. And, as it unfolds, it appears some tweaking of AutoLand software may be in order. Amazing that Max Trescott captured some of the audio while in flight, too.
So, a pilot aboard did communicate with ATC but on Guard; they were unable to switch a radio to a normal frequency once AutoLand was initiated automatically via the EDM mode sensing an issue. Another pilot had to advise them of that over the radio; they didn’t know it. More training, please! And, Garmin better make it possible for crew to talk on ONE radio, at least. Use of guard by pushing the PTT — apparently — did not shut down the AutoLand function, either. And, it would have been possible to cancel AutoLand and then reengage it IF necessary. That automated voice message needs to be revisited, as well. The pilot is talking coherently on Guard while the automated message is saying,”Pilot Incapacitated.” Finally, the floor of the EDM function is 14,000′ requiring further reengagement if you wanted it to move onto to “Part II” of the process … which they did.
Looks to me like Garmin better revisit the software of this system. Further, unless the pressurization system never worked and the crew seriously questioned their ability to fly having been deprived of O2, this was not an emergency requiring a reactivation of the system once it reached the floor for EDM mode. It’s obvious crew training was an issue in this incident.
Some discussion about this – I’d argue that even an inadvertent activation of autoland should not be overridden (easily) by the pilot. We all know that hypoxia can induce feelings of well-being and confidence, and the last thing we want is a pilot that’s actually incapacitated but doesn’t realize it to re-take control of the aircraft and crash.
IMHO, no tweaking of the system needed. A system intended for use „by“ incapacitated pilots was used by non- incapacitated pilots who could and probably should have known much more about the system. This was not intended use, simple as that.
“The pilot is talking coherently on Guard while the automated message is saying,”Pilot Incapacitated.”
I’ve listened to a couple of audio recordings of pilots suffering from hypoxia.
All of them are talking coherently. At least they *think* they are talking coherently, for all others listening, it’s gibberish.
Pushing the Autoland button might be the last coherent action a pilot will take-after that, he/she will need a 3rd party verification that yes, they are coherent and able to make decisions.
Might be as simple as an in-line pulse ox meter.
Has it been confirmed the depressurization event actually occurred?