Let me preface this by saying that this is in no way a definitive analysis of recent newsworthy events. In every incident, there are experts who will analyze the events to the nth degree and provide a professional analysis. Such efforts often take months to come to fruition.
However, recent newsworthy events can stimulate generic discussions on best aeronautical practices and procedures. There is a difference.
I remember my captain upgrade LOFT (Line Oriented Flight Training) checkride like it was yesterday, even though it was over 30 years ago. The LOFT program is itself a product of decades of incident and accident analysis and cooperation among multiple aviation safety teams in government and the private sector, together active in the never-ending quest to make pilot training more efficient and effective.
In greatly simplified form, I found myself in the left seat of a B-737 simulator. We had just completed a missed approach due to weather at KDAL (Love Field), and during that process, we found ourselves having to shut down one engine due to overheating issues. As a crew, we had to make a decision, but since this was “my ride” and I occupied the “left seat,” the final onus (and pressure to perform) rested upon me.
The decision matrix was that we could land in just a few minutes at DFW (Dallas Fort Worth), where the weather was legal but barely above minimums, or we could divert to our alternate of Oklahoma City.
The weather at OKC was clear skies, 50 miles visibility, with strong winds.
My first officer, who was sitting in the left seat the previous day, elected to go to DFW and get on the ground faster. I elected to go to OKC. Numerous factors, which aren’t relevant to this treatise, played out in the decision for both of us. We both landed safely, and we both passed the checkride. Additionally, we were both strongly challenged in the debrief to defend our respective decisions.
In reality, since there was no right or wrong decision to be made, the only way to fail the exercise (other than crashing the sim) was to second-guess ourselves after the decision and change our plan midstream.
Well can we …
All airplanes carry performance data, and all airline operations require significant calculations by the crewmembers and dispatchers of what can and can’t be done safely. The reason that the performance calculations are accomplished primarily during the calmness of being on the ground is that there are certain flight regimes where there simply isn’t time to pull the books out. Arrivals and departures are prime examples. We are all taught the procedures for things such as aborted takeoffs and landings, go-arounds, missed approaches, etc., and we practice those extensively on every checkride.
Certain key factors are predetermined before touching the throttles. One example is the V1 decision speed. Below V1 you stop, above V1 you go. That is the “envelope” wherein the safety calculations have already been made. You can’t take a pause to decide, and you most assuredly can’t change your mind after initialization. To do otherwise, the performance parameters are tossed out the window, and the crew is just spam in a can, hoping for the best.
A couple of other split-second decision examples are initiating an aborted takeoff and then changing midstream, and conversely, initiating a go-around or aborted landing and then changing plan to attempt to salvage the landing. Both are huge no-no’s that are stressed in every training event. Once the throttles or thrust reverse levers are up, you’re committed, cowboy (as one beloved instructor used to say).
In the interest of full disclosure, there are two caveats to all of the above. One is if the airplane’s ability to fly is in question (such as striking something significant or other form of structural damage), and the other is the ultimate caveat in the federal regulations, which is commonly referred to as “ captain’s emergency authority.” Invoking either to deviate from policy or procedure is sure to trigger a vigorous post-event debrief, even if the final outcome is successful. (Which it often isn’t.)
Even in small aircraft, there is wisdom in making critical decisions about the performance capabilities and the environmental conditions one faces while enjoying zero airspeed on the ramp with the parking brake set. This practice inherently goes hand in hand with committing certain proper procedures to rote memory and sticking to them religiously when the luxury of time isn’t available.
Indecision kills.
There is another, equally important way that indecision kills. And that is what’s commonly referred to as the “Startle Factor”. That’s when the PIC is startled by an event (and it can be anything, even non-flight safety issues) – and you, as the pilot, quit flying the airplane. That moment of startle, indecision, lock-up, call it what you may – can be a killer. No matter what’s happening – fly the airplane.
For all the caveat of “generic discussions”, this was a thinly disguised condemnation of the crew of Amazon Air before the final accident report is released. It definitely has its place in time, but its application, in my opinion, makes more sense if directed and tailored to those just starting out in flying or adding to early credentials for their ticket. When I did eventually see the phrase “in the interest of full disclosure” I thought for a second an actual recent real life example of indecision was going to be brought up that would really hit home and be of immense learning value for those in light aircraft. In any case, the author’s last paragraph is spot on, and might even should include “personaI” as well as “performance” capabilities. I liked the previous comment, and the conclusion: no matter what’s happening – fly the airplane.