An Epic E1000 that crashed on approach to Steamboat Springs/Bob Adams Field last week descended through the minimum descent altitude at a waypoint before crashing 4 miles short of the airport on a mountaintop, according to an AOPA Air Safety Institute “early analysis” of the accident. The organization released a video examining the accident based on available data. “ADS-B data show the pilot at 9,025 feet msl when he crossed the waypoint WDCHK, which has an MDA of 9,100 feet msl—meaning the aircraft was 75 feet lower than it should have been,” ASI Senior Vice President Mike Ginter said. “The aircraft continued to descend until it impacted terrain shortly thereafter.” Four people died in the crash.
Ginter said the circumstances of the crash, which occurred in bad weather just after midnight local time, naturally raises questions about the pilot’s proficiency and state of mind and the equipment on board. “We believe some questions the NTSB will be asking in its investigation will be, for example, ‘What was the pilot’s mountain flying experience?’ ‘Why did the aircraft descend below the MDA before the pilot had the runway in sight?’ ‘Were the aircraft’s avionics set correctly?’ and, ‘Was there pressure to “get in” under less-than-ideal circumstances?’” he added.
Aaron Stokes, a businessman from Franklin, Tennessee, his son Jakson Stokes, 21, and nephew Colin Stokes, 21, and Austin Huskey, 37, all from the same area, were identified as the victims. After a fuel stop in Kansas City, the aircraft went direct to Steamboat Springs. The NTSB and FAA are investigating.
In my Colorado Pilots Association mountain training, I remember my instructor telling me that experienced local pilots don’t fly IFR in the mountains, period. A flatlander in and out of IMC at night in a hot airplane, with the PAPI OTS?…
Also, the approaches are not authorized for cat C/D airplanes — which technically speaking the Epic is not — but if you fly at cat C speeds you are required to abide by those minimums.
I’ve watched several videos on this now, and no one has mentioned that the broken layer at 1600 feet is below the minimums for the RNAV RWY 32 approach. However it is above the minimums of the RNAV E approach. Both approaches cross MABKY and both hav and IAF of TILLI. There is no way to confirm this but there is a possibility that the wrong approach was loaded in the avionics. It’ll be interesting to read the ATC communications to verify which approach the pilot was cleared to fly.
especially negligent as a 10,000 ft airport with great approaches was 20 miles west with good transportation to steamboat. get home disease
“Why did the aircraft descend below the MDA before the pilot had the runway in sight?”
Flying any kind of an approach in tight, mountainous terrain can be a challenge. Doing so at night is foolish. On a dark night, mountains and rising terrain are as black as the surrounding elevation. This blending of hazards provides a false sense of clearance, especially when runway lights are the only visible reference on a night descent. Any weather, obviously, makes it that much worse.
Yampa Valley (Hayden) airport to the West of Steamboat is a good alternative. In fact, it’s the only alternative for commercial flights into Steamboat Springs.
It is interesting to note that the FAA issued an FDC NOTAM yesterday (6 days after the accident) making the RNAV Z RWY 32 approach “NA” until at least October 1 (and that date merely “estimated”).
I’m also wondering if that pilot was presented with and followed +V advisory vertical guidance on that LNAV-only approach. My calculations and a review of the approach chart and sectional suggest that a straight-line descent from 9100 at WDCHK to the runway would hit the 8000′ terrain near the depicted 8353 obstruction halfway between WDCHK and ACDIY. That could explain why he impacted terrain below the MDA after the hard 9100 floor at WDCHK. I stress to my instrument trainees that +V does NOT guarantee obstruction clearance below the MDA but I’m not sure that’s well taught in initial refresher instrument training.
And, of course, one can only wonder if the accident pilot saw the “Rwy 32 Straight-in minimums NA at night” note on that chart. Even if he was planning to circle, he should never have left the 9100 MDA until inside the Circling Approach Area beginning 2.1 nm from the approach end of the runway for his likely Category B approach speed. This is another point I think not well understood by many instrument pilots.