Our question this week comes from a reader who regularly flies in the congested New York area airspace, and he presents a conundrum for our CFI this week, Doug Auclair, to answer, as he’s been based in the region for decades.
“That I have been flying for some 20 years, with nearly 5,000 hours, doesn’t change the fact that pilots are always learning—facing new and often unanticipated scenarios and being asked to make decisions at the spur of the moment with little time for reflection.
“The following took place a year or three ago—just north of and within the New York Class Bravo airspace, and the partially contained KHPN Class Delta airspace.
“I had completed my photo mission over Ossining (along the Hudson River, and just outside the airspace noted above) and wanted to head to my next photo assignment over Stamford, Connecticut. The direct route would take me just north of the NY Bravo and likewise just north of HPN, transiting the HPN Delta; I knew (while monitoring Approach and HPN Tower) that HPN was busy, and launching off of Runway 34. I requested from HPN—and received—permission to transition direct to Stamford, at 2,000 feet MSL. Nearing the departure corridor off the north end of Runway 34, I marveled at the stream of beautiful corporate jets passing overhead—until I was interrupted by HPN Tower asking that I descend to 1,200 feet on account of the departures.
“Neither the FAA nor I would consider this area—an inner suburb of NYC—anything other than ‘built up,’ so my minimum altitude should be 1,000 feet above the ground and any structure, person, etc., according to the regs. The combination of hills and structures meant that at 1,200 feet MSL (as requested by Tower) I was likely in violation of CFR 91.119. What should I have done? Accept a brief interval of flight at a too-low altitude, turned back and notified Tower of my intention to exit their airspace and take the long way around, or climbed to what I considered a safe altitude—within a Delta altitudes are advisory and separation is visual anyway.
“To my mind the last option is potentially quite risky, the first only slightly so, and the middle safest but inconvenient.
“What do the experts think I should have done?”
Auclair responds: This is a great scenario—and we thank you for the submission. I have created an image, shown below, to aid in visualizing the operation.
First off, flight training really is the training to be pilots flying missions, not just to earn certificates. It doesn’t matter if you make money flying, fly to make money, or just burn holes in the sky for fun—once you complete your training, you are an aviator. Mission planning is critical, and it all starts before you leave the ground. Even when a flight is routine it’s important to take the time to pre-plan every element of the flight using all of the current and available information so that we don’t unintentionally end up in a situation where we might be unsafe and in a position to violate a regulation or cause undue harm to people or property.
During initial pilot training instructors (hopefully) emphasize the importance of preflight planning. We know that as pilots we are required to comply with FAR 91.103 and (hopefully) as an aviator we always do. Now, what decades of experience as a CFI and years administering tests as a DPE have taught me is that just because pilots comply with that preflight planning requirement, that doesn’t mean that they apply it once they get into the airplane.
Before every flight I require that all of my students complete a TOLD (takeoff and landing distance) card that complies with all of the 91.103 requirements. We then brief all of the actions of our flight, every time, regardless of the scheduled lesson and how many times we have done that same thing. The reason for this is because I am focused not on a student being able to demonstrate to a DPE or the FAA that they have in fact complied with the regulation, but to build good muscle memory so that when they earn that certificate and are out on their own flying missions they have the good habit of planning and application of planning to rely on. That will ensure that when they encounter the unknown variables in every flight that they already have a predetermined course of action that they can default to while they recalculate the problem presented to them in flight.
An overlooked part of the preflight planning process is determining alternates; pilots will identify an alternate airport that they could go to if their flight doesn’t work out, but what I see much of the time when doing flight reviews or even instrument proficiency checks is that pilots don’t actually account for their route of flight to the alternate airport. That can lead to high-workload, high-stress situations in the event of a diversion, or as in this instance, an unexpected route or altitude change because of airspace saturation or activation. Let’s apply the process to this situation.
In this scenario the pilot was operating on a photo mission just outside of one of the busiest regions of airspace in the country. While the weather was probably good (it was a photo mission) that only actually means that the airspace is generally busier, especially around the NY Metro area and surrounding airports. When the pilot was on the ground planning the photo mission—and planning to fly directly from one point to another as the easiest way—it would have been a prudent decision to think about an “alternate” way of getting from Ossing to Stamford in the event of airspace saturation that might prevent a transition through the Westchester (HPN) Class Delta, especially knowing that the traffic there was departing Runway 34—and a direct path between the two took the pilot knowingly right through the departure corridor.
The pilot in this scenario was granted the transition at their desired altitude; however, he was then asked to descend to 1,200 feet MSL as he transitioned the departure corridor. Looking at the sectional chart excerpt you can see that has a couple of implications. First, it puts the pilot at the MEF (maximum elevation figure) for the area block, Second, it puts them at around 700 feet AGL in the general vicinity of the Class D airspace and Hawthorn / Pleasantville area, which (though there’s always a hot debate around it) puts them below 1,000 feet AGL over a congested area. Now the outcome of this flight was uneventful; however, if the aviator had done preflight planning who knows if they had stopped to consider alternate routes based on altitude—even though they’re in the vicinity of sea level.
Plan Like an Airshow Pilot
Everyone has been at an airshow or seen the videos of airshow performers looking sort of silly “flying” their routines in a hangar or on the ground next to their airplane. What they are doing is practically applying the elements of 91.103 to their flight and making sure that they know what to do, when to do it, and what their out is if something starts to go wrong at any part of it. The application of the preflight planning mnemonic NWKRAFT (NOTAMs, weather, known ATC delays, runway lengths, alternates available, fuel requirements, and TOLD) is more critical than the exercise of just doing it.
While we’re not all lucky enough to be airshow pilots, we can put this into practice every time we fly. I generally use takeoff and landing distance planning as a demonstration point. If you plan your takeoff to be 1,100 feet, your landing distance to be 800 feet, and find yourself 1,600 feet down a runway that is only 2,300 feet long, what would you do? If we’re applying our preflight planning, once we crossed the 1,100-foot threshold for takeoff, we should have been strongly considering aborting the takeoff because we had exceeded our planned distance. However, in many cases you see pilots continue because they have exceeded that planning hundreds of times with no negative result. It doesn’t mean it’s safe, it just means that nothing bad happened. In that instance if they attempted to abort at 1,700 feet down the runway, and their planned landing distance was 800, stopping before the pavement ended would be pure luck at best.
In our write-in scenario, nothing bad happened, but if it did the pilot could have faced significant consequences not just from the FAA but from a low-altitude issue over a congested area. If they had planned a possible alternate route in this instance—including any additional fuel or time allotted—then they would have ensured that they felt that they maintained the safety of their operation while still being able to execute their planned mission.
Remember—because you do something as an aviator and don’t experience a negative outcome doesn’t mean that you did something successfully or that your skills are superior. Many times, luck can play just as big of a factor. We want to manufacture our own luck by considering and then applying sound fundamental practice to every mission that we fly.
That being said, the correct response should have been to say, “Unable, for terrain and obstruction clearance. Request to maintain 2,000 or alternate routing.”
I transit this particular bit of airspace regularly. In my experience I find requesting “over the top” of the airport, rather than simply “direct”, gets the best results. Unless it’s an active drop zone, no one is approaching an airport from directly overhead.
So in this instance I would’ve ask for clearance “over the top (or midfield, or tower) and then direct Stamford” at 2500 (instead of 2000′). That would ensure both horizontal and vertical clearance of the departure and arrival corridors and well above pattern altitude. Once clear of the Delta to the east you can then descend as needed.
I’ve used this same tactic of “over the top” when crossing other airports and it seems to be well received by the controllers.
Excellent point/suggestion. This offers the controller a much simpler separation problem, if they are busy they will really appreciate it.
The question was what should the pilot have done when he found himself in that unexpected situation at that moment. You answered with what he should have done before it happened, which while good advice does not answer the question at all.
I agree that the original question was left unanswered.
I know what my response would have been, though: “Unable, but we can take higher than 2000”. If ATC still insisted on the lower altitude, I would have asked for a suggested heading to exit the airspace/departure corridor and taken the “long” way around (which really isn’t that much of a detour).
The last option of ignoring ATC’s instruction and climbing to a pilot-determined safe altitude should obviously be a bad choice. Even though Class-D towers are mainly there to provide sequencing, once a clearance has been accepted, a pilot is expected to comply with it unless they either encounter an emergency or request and are approved for an alternate clearance. Never mind that simply climbing could put the pilot in direct conflict with other traffic.
You are correct, Gary.
Yes, he did answer the question. Read his last sentence.
I’m guessing that request came after passing Ossining. In that case I would request about a 5-10 degree left to fly the gap between Chappaqua and Pleasantville at 1200ft, then resume direct to Stamford at 1500ft. If I was doing pre-flight planning (knowing what I know about HPN IFR traffic), I would just plan to stay out of the class D since a slight detour around would not be that much longer and would have prevented the mentioned situation.
The map displayed must be an older version. My Garmin Pilot sectional display shows 2000ft as MSA where the map displayed on this article shows 1200ft. Most GPS’s have moving maps so diverting around the class D or changing route as I suggested earlier should not be too difficult.
Older map? Negative, looks like sectional vs. TAC.
Significant caveat here, the latter part of my active flying did not include regular VFR navigation with VFR charts, so I am “rusty”. But I see what I recognize to be a 1200 ft MOCA along that route which is a legal and safe minimum obstacle altitude to fly in that area. The only charted obstacle elevation I see is a 500 ft unpopulated ridge just SE of Osinning. I obviously would not have been sharp enough to realize I had a legal or safety problem flying VFR at 1200 ft as cleared by ATC and simply would have done so.
The blue 12 on the sectional is not a MOCA, nor is it an MSA—it is an MEF, MINIMUM ELEVATION FIGURE.
Genuine thanks Raf. I honestly don’t remember minimum elevation figures. I’m now your most eager multi thousand hour jet pilot eager-for-more primary student. Please say more.
MAX not min. A distinctiom with a difference…
Yes, (MEF) Maximum Elevation Figure. Thank you for the correction.
Good to know. Thanks to you both Rich and Raf. And thank you Doug for the article. Retired and now flying RC airplanes only, I’m still learning.
For the record, what will likely turn out to be my final flight as PIC was in my beloved Cessna 120 two years ago which I flew mostly locally with minimal reference to sectional charts.
John Kliewer, Rick, that correction brought back something I learned years ago from Frank Tullo, one of the early people involved in CRM. His advice to captains when a first officer or any crew member caught an error was simple: Say “Thank you.”
United 173 (December 28, 1978) is a good reminder of why. The DC-8 crew became preoccupied with a landing gear problem while holding near Portland.
The fuel kept dropping, and although the other crew members raised the issue, they never conveyed its seriousness strongly enough. The captain did not act on what they were telling him; the airplane ran out of fuel, and ten people were killed.
Accidents like that helped bring about Crew Resource Management, with much more emphasis on communication, monitoring, and getting past the old authority gradient in the cockpit.
Tullo, an Air Force pilot who later became a Continental captain and instructor, helped turn those ideas into practical airline CRM. His point was simple. If somebody catches something you missed, there is no need to explain it away, defend yourself, or pull rank.
Accept the correction and move on.
Thank you.
That lesson stuck with me.
And in that spirit, thank you, Raf, and all for the corrections and the discussion; we’ve updated the post accordingly.
bro,
this article went from a simple question to a jumbled essay on your CFI teaching technique. And somehow involved airshow planning considerations. May want to revisit the title of this commentary to importance of pre-flight planning and real time situational awareness while executing flight ops.
Precisely. At the end of reading the article, I intended to post something of the same – and then saw that several people had already beat me to it.
Many pilots are unaware that ATC cannot authorize a deviation from FARs. Some do try, and yes, “unable” is the correct response.
I don’t think it’s so much a matter of ATC intentionally trying to authorize a deviation from an FAR as much as it is them not being aware of the FARs (in the same manner that most pilots are not aware of the regulations that ATC has to follow).
Agree, I don’t mean to imply intentionally disregarding FARs, but it has happened out of ignorance. I’ve just been amazed at the number of pilots who don’t know that. I took a poll one in a WINGS class, and it was 50-50.
You are correct. Pilots, ATC personnel,and the people who design procedures operate in different worlds and often don’t know enough about how those other worlds function.
> Jon Kodani, my advanced flight instructor, emphasized that reality in our instrument rating classes and individual instruction. He taught that an IFR plate was designed to fit legal requirements specified in regulations and legal descriptions of procedures, the practical needs and requirements of ATC, and the operational needs of pilots navigating the system.
. He felt that we needed to have a good understanding of how all these roles function together so we could put ourselves in the shoes of the controllers, for instance, and have a better understanding of what they do, and why.
. PS – he was a designated examiner for Cessna Citation pilots and became a practicing attorney during the time he was giving us instruction. He eventually built a practice in Santa Monica with a dozen attorneys and about 30 paralegals. Many aviation related cases.
Wow that was a long diatribe to come up with a poor answer to a simple problem. ATC gave you 1200 in their area of responsibility because that is the number on the chart that gives you the obstruction clearance and he doesn’t think you’re over something in pleasantville that would mandate more. If you disagree, put your big boy pants on and side step a little as required and enjoy the view. It ain’t rocket science.